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A proposed remedy for biased affective forecasts is to base judgments on the actual feelings of 
people (surrogates) currently experiencing the event, rather than using imagination which 
conjures an inaccurate vision of the future. Gilbert et al. (2009) forced people to use surrogate 
reports by withholding all event information, resulting in better predictions. However, in life 
surrogate information rarely supplants event information - can people effectively integrate both 
types of information into their judgments? In 5 studies, respondents predicted the impact of a 
health state on their own happiness. Respondents incorporated surrogate information into their 
judgments both in the presence and absence of event information. However, they inappropriately 
discounted other people’s experiences as a valid predictor of their own - particularly in the 
presence of event information – and imagined their happiness would be different to surrogates’ 
happiness. Excluding pre-existing event knowledge, changing the size of the surrogate sample, 
or increasing the size of the response scale, did not alter the adjustment. Although surrogate 
information improved affective forecasts, its influence was diminished by the presence of event 
information. 
 
Key words: Affective forecasting, Surrogation, Impact bias, Health state 
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My Imagination vs. Your Feelings: Can Personal Affective Forecasts Be Improved By Knowing 
Other Peoples’ Emotions? 
 
 The conclusion that people predict their future emotions inaccurately - by overestimating 
both the intensity and duration of their emotional response to an event - is clearly demonstrated 
in a range of empirical studies (Dunn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2004; Gilbert, Driver-Linn, & Wilson, 
2002; Ubel et al., 2001). This effect, known as the impact bias, has been shown for a wide-range 
of events, from mis-predicting the impact of winning a football match (Wilson, Wheatley, 
Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000), to electoral defeat (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & 
Wheatley, 1998), to failing a driving test (Ayton, Pott, & Elwakili, 2007). The impact bias has 
also been measured for more consequential events, such as the influence of chronic health states 
on well-being: people overestimate the impact of a variety of health states on both their own 
happiness as well as other peoples’ happiness (Walsh & Ayton, 2009) despite there actually 
being little variation in the happiness of people living with or without chronic health states 
(Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-Bulman, 1978; Walsh & Ayton, 2009). This leads to a discrepancy 
between non-patients’ predictions and patients’ actual experiences (Hurst et al., 1994; Riis et al., 
2005). A discrepancy between anticipated and experienced outcomes may lead to suboptimal 
decisions (Sevdalis & Harvey, 2007) which, in a medical context could have serious long-term 
consequences.  
  Why do we persistently make these errors in our affective forecasts? Several explanations 
suggest that we do not accurately imagine the future event. One proposal, known as the focusing 
illusion, suggests that people incorrectly focus on the target event and disregard other events 
which could also impact and moderate their future emotions, resulting in extreme forecasts 
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(Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2006; Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; Wilson et 
al., 2000). A further proposed error with the imagination process is that people fail to imagine 
that they would adapt to the future event, a process of unforeseen adaptation (Gilbert et al., 
1998). They imagine their immediate affective reaction and fail to take into consideration that 
over time their reaction to the event would diminish and they would return to their baseline 
emotional state.  
 If we can not accurately imagine our reaction to a future event, how about recalling 
memories of our past experiences as a guide to predicting our future happiness? Studies have 
shown that not only can we not accurately remember how we felt (Wirtz, Kruger, Scallon, & 
Diener, 2003) but that we also tend to recall atypical instances of the event, thereby biasing our 
future predictions (Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993; Morewedge, 
Gilbert, & Wilson, 2005). 
 It would therefore seem that our imaginations, and our memories, lead us down the 
garden path when it comes to anticipating our future emotions. Furthermore, endeavours to 
reduce the impact of these effects on predictions have produced mixed results. Ubel, 
Loewenstein, and Jepson (2005) compared different methods designed either to reduce the 
impact of the focusing illusion or of unforeseen adaptation. They found that exercises designed 
to reduce the focusing illusion had limited effect (a finding consistent with Baron et al., 2003; 
Ubel et al., 2001; and Walsh & Ayton, 2009). However, exercises which drew attention to the 
process of adaptation successfully reduced the bias, leading Ubel et al. (2005) to conclude that 
unforeseen adaptation was a more appropriate explanation for the impact bias shown for health 
states.  
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 Another proposed remedy to overcome the failings in our imagination is to disregard 
imagination entirely and instead base judgments on the actual feelings of people currently 
experiencing the event - a process termed surrogation (Gilbert, 2006). When people are denied 
the information that imagination requires to make a future prediction, and are only given 
information about the feelings of others’, they make more accurate forecasts. Gilbert, 
Killingsworth, Eyre, and Wilson (2009) demonstrated that women more accurately predicted 
their enjoyment of a speed-date when they were provided with the enjoyment ratings of another 
woman who had experienced that date (surrogate information), than when provided with profile 
information about the date (event information). This was despite 75% of respondents believing 
that receiving event information would lead them to more accurate forecasts than receiving 
surrogate information.  
Similarly, Norwick, Gilbert, and Wilson (2006) recorded how a group of people felt after 
they had received a prize and then taken part in a tedious task. A second group was informed that 
they would also receive the prize and participate in the task, but half of the respondents were told 
what the prize was and the other half were given the reported feelings of a member of the first 
group. Respondents who only knew what the prize was did not accurately predict their future 
feelings; arguably because they had used their imaginations to envisage receiving the prize but 
had failed to anticipate how the tedious task would make them feel. In contrast, respondents who 
could only base their judgments on the reported feelings of a member of the previous group 
made accurate forecasts: although they had no information about the future event, by basing their 
judgments on the experiences of the surrogates they correctly anticipated their future feelings. 
 These findings suggest that for people to accurately predict their future happiness, they 
should not contemplate information about the future event – thereby disabling their imaginations 
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- and instead base their judgments on the feelings of others. Although a fitting suggestion in 
theory, it will, arguably, not often be feasible in practice.  Outside of the laboratory, when 
making predictions about the impact of a future event, people rarely know how that event is 
making someone else feel without at the same time knowing something about the event itself. 
For example, we can read reports of how much critics enjoyed a movie but also know who stars 
in the film, or we can read reviews of hotels but see pictures of its location, making it difficult to 
separate event information and surrogate information when making our predictions. While it 
might be possible to withhold event information under some circumstances (e.g. one might not 
tell a child that their sandwich contained some ingredient they professed repugnance of) it is 
difficult to see how information could be practically and ethically withheld in more 
consequential cases.  For example when contemplating the impact of a health state on happiness; 
it is highly doubtful that people could be told about the happiness of surrogates without some 
information about the health state also being disclosed. Even if all that people knew was the 
name of the health state, this might still be enough to enable their imaginations to bias their 
judgments. Gilbert et al. (2009, p.1619) conceded that “…people may be reluctant to engage in 
surrogation if they have the opportunity to do otherwise”. For the surrogacy proposal to provide 
an effective panacea for the bias in judgments, an important issue is whether people incorporate 
surrogate information into their judgments when presented alongside event information, as well 
as when presented on its own. 
 A potential limitation of surrogate information as a guide to personal happiness is that its 
value may be downplayed because people believe they are different to others (Kruger, 1999). 
Most people believe themselves more likely than the average person to be a better driver or live 
past 70 years; and less likely than the average person to own an airplane or get lung cancer 
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(Kruger & Burrus, 2004; Svenson, 1981; Weinstein, 1980). Furthermore they think that life 
events would affect them in a different way to how they affect others: people predict that their 
own happiness would be more affected by a health state than other people’s happiness would be 
(Walsh & Ayton, 2009). Gilbert (2006) proposed that when given the choice people would prefer 
to receive event information to surrogate information precisely because they believe they are 
different to the surrogates. Moreover, as reported above, Gilbert et al. (2009) found that most of 
their respondents believed that event information would be more useful than surrogate 
information. Therefore if presented with both types of information, it follows that people may 
discount the happiness of other people as a guide to their own happiness and use the event 
information to imagine how life would be different for them.  
 The aim of the following five studies was to explore whether people contemplating the 
impact of a health state incorporate information about others’ happiness into their judgments. In 
particular, how do people respond when they are presented with both surrogate information and 
health state information? Do they realise the value of surrogate information or do they prefer to 
use their imaginations and base their judgments on the health state information? Does varying 
the degree to which surrogate information matches expectations affect the extent to which it is 
used? Is surrogate information used differently when predictions are being made for self-
happiness, or the happiness of someone else? In all 5 studies, respondents were asked to imagine 
that they had just been diagnosed with a health state and to predict what their happiness would be 
after living with that health state for 1 year. It was predicted that respondents would fail to realise 
the value of other peoples’ feelings and disregard the surrogate information, particularly when 
presented alongside health state information, in favour of their imaginations.  
My Imagination      8 
 
 
Study 1: Using Others’ Happiness to Predict Self Happiness 
 The aim of this study was to explore the predicted impact on happiness of living with a 
chronic health state (kidney disease) for 1 year, after being presented with either surrogate 
information, health state information, or both surrogate information and health state information. 
The surrogate information presented was a happiness rating of 6.5 on a scale ranging from 1 (not 
happy) to 9 (very happy). This was the self-reported average happiness rating of a sample of 10 
people living with kidney disease taken from Walsh and Ayton (2009). As non-patients 
overestimate the impact on happiness of living with a health state, we expected that this 
surrogate information would have seemed surprisingly high on the happiness scale to the 
respondents. Nonetheless it was predicted that respondents presented with only surrogate 
information would make more accurate predictions (i.e. closer to the surrogate value) than 
respondents presented with only health state information, or both surrogate information and 
health state information.  
 The accuracy of predictions was assessed indirectly because respondents did not actually 
experience the health state. Instead a cross-sectional design was used where respondents’ 
predictions were compared with the experiences of others. This design has several advantages 
over a longitudinal design as it allows us to test the predicted impact of a rare event, such as a 
health state; it avoids any issues with re-interpretation of the scale which can occur once people 
have experienced an event; and it avoids any anchoring or priming on previous predictions 
(Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999). Therefore, in this study, the surrogate value has a special status 
because it is our best estimate of what the respondents’ happiness would actually be if they were 
experiencing the health state we are asking them to consider.  Gilbert et al.’s (2009) and Norwick 
et al.’s (2006) studies established that, for the cases they examined, surrogate reports were 
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indeed good predictors of their respondents’ actual affective states.  Of course, the logic of the 
surrogacy proposal for generally improving affective forecasts is that surrogate experiences are, 
in general, good predictors of other people’s experiences.  Accordingly our assumption is that we 
can use this surrogate value to benchmark the accuracy of affective forecasts.   
Method 
Design 
 There were 3 independent-samples conditions (only surrogate information, only health 
state information, surrogate and health state information). The dependent variable was happiness 
rating on a scale from 1 (not happy) to 9 (very happy). Respondents, randomly allocated to a 
condition, rated on the scale their current happiness, their predicted immediate happiness just 
after the described scenario, and their predicted happiness 1 year after the scenario.  
Participants 
 639 respondents took part in the study, 73% of which were female. Age ranged from 18 
to 58 years with a mean age of 21 years. Respondents were recruited via emails sent to UK 
university degree administrators (of varying subjects), who forwarded the invitation on to staff (n 
= 3) and students (n = 636). For completing the questionnaire, respondents were offered the 
opportunity to take part in a prize draw to win £20 of online store vouchers.   
Procedure 
 Respondents completed the questionnaire over the Internet. They indicated their gender, 
age, and rated, “How happy would you say you are these days?” at the start or end of the 
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questionnaire, and then read one of the following scenarios (information in brackets was 
removed for respondents not receiving surrogate information): 
Health state information [and surrogate information] scenario: 
1
  
Imagine you are being told by your doctor that you have developed kidney disease. In 
order to explain the likely impact of the condition, [the doctor tells you that a random 
sample of 10 people who have been living with kidney disease for at least 1 year report 
an average happiness of 6.5 on the 1-not happy to 9-very happy scale.] The doctor 
informs you that this is a condition in which there are abnormalities in your kidneys. This 
has resulted in kidney failure and you will need to be treated with dialysis, a process 
which typically involves you being connected via tubes to an artificial kidney machine to 
remove the waste products from your blood stream. You will need to receive dialysis 
either in a hospital for approximately 4 hours every 3 days a week, or at home for 
approximately 1 hour every day. You are informed that this treatment is not a cure and 
therefore dialysis will be required for your lifetime, or until you are eligible for a kidney 
transplant. Before the doctor can discuss this further a nurse comes into the room to ask a 
question about another patient. 
Only surrogate information scenario:  
Imagine you are being told by your doctor that you have developed a medical condition. 
In order to explain the likely impact of the condition, the doctor tells you that a random 
sample of 10 people who have been living with this condition for at least 1 year report an 
average happiness of 6.5 on the 1-not happy to 9-very happy scale. Before the doctor can 
discuss this further a nurse comes into the room to ask a question about another patient. 
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 All respondents then predicted, “At that moment, how happy do you expect you would 
be?” (a filler question to assist respondents in differentiating between their immediate reaction to 
diagnosis and their more long-term reaction), and “How happy do you expect you would be 1 
year after living with this condition?” (the target question). Finally all respondents indicated 
whether they or someone close to them was living with kidney disease.  
Results 
 Forty-eight respondents indicated that they or someone close to them was living with 
kidney disease and therefore their data were excluded from the analyses, leaving complete data 
for 591 respondents. Analyses revealed that rating current happiness before or after reading the 
scenario did not significantly affect respondents’ predictions; therefore data are collapsed across 
this variable. In all of the studies, correlations between age of the respondent and predicted 
happiness were examined for age-related differences but no significant relationship was found. 
All of the subsequent effect sizes are based on Cohen (1988) and assume a small effect = .10, 
medium effect = .30, and a large effect = .50. 
Did respondents predict that their happiness 1 year after living with Kidney Disease 
would be different from their current happiness? A 2 (happiness: current, predicted) x 3 
(condition: only surrogate information, only health state information, surrogate and health state 
information) mixed ANOVA revealed that respondents predicted a significant decrease in their 
happiness 1 year after living with kidney disease, F(1, 588) = 652.55, p < 0.01, r = 0.73 (see 
figure 1).  There was also a significant interaction, F(2, 588) = 33.80, p < 0.01; although 
respondents’ current happiness ratings did not differ across the 3 conditions, F(2, 588) = 0.43, p 
= 0.65, there were significant differences in respondents’ predictions, F(2, 588) = 53.06, p < 
0.01, r = 0.30 (see table 1). Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that respondents presented with 
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surrogate and health state information made significantly higher (more happy) predictions than 
those presented with only health state information (p < 0.01). Furthermore, respondents who 
received only surrogate information made significantly higher predictions than those with 
surrogate and health state information (p < 0.01), and those presented with only health state 
information (p < 0.01).  
Despite the judgments of respondents who received only surrogate information being the 
happiest, were their predictions as to their future happiness similar to the surrogate rating of 6.5 
that they were given? A one-sample t-test compared their predictions with the surrogate rating of 
6.5 and revealed that there was a significant difference between how happy they predicted they 
would be and the reported happiness of the surrogates, t(122) = -6.87, p < 0.01, r = 0.53.  
Respondents presented with only surrogate information predicted that they would be 
significantly less happy 1 year after living with kidney disease than the surrogates reported.  
Discussion 
 Surrogate information improved affective forecasts both in the presence and absence of 
health state information.  Respondents presented with only surrogate information integrated it 
into their judgments to make significantly more accurate predictions (i.e. predictions closer to the 
surrogate value) than those given only health state information, replicating previous findings 
(Gilbert et al., 2009). In fact, they made significantly more accurate predictions than respondents 
presented with any health state information. When presented with surrogate and health state 
information, respondents used both types of information to make their predictions. We can infer 
this because they made significantly more accurate predictions than respondents presented with 
only health state information and they made significantly less accurate predictions than 
respondents presented with only surrogate information.   
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 However people did not make as accurate predictions as they could have done because 
they discounted the surrogate information somewhat, even when it was the only information 
presented. Moreover they discounted surrogate information more in the presence of health state 
information - people used their imaginations to moderate predictions of their future happiness 
rather than realising the value of other peoples’ feelings – highlighting a problem in situations 
where event information can not be easily withheld. However, we should reiterate that our 
assessments of the accuracy of respondents’ predictions were assessed indirectly:  since 
respondents could not be “given” the health state it was not possible to compare their predictions 
with their own experiences. Nonetheless, as the surrogate value was the actual happiness of 
people living with kidney disease, and we have no grounds to believe that our respondents would 
experience this condition any differently to the surrogate sample, we have used it as a benchmark 
to estimate what our respondents’ happiness would actually be. 
 Why did respondents discount the surrogate value? Given that respondents’ average self-
rated current happiness was 6.8, it may well be that the surrogate value of 6.5 was judged 
implausibly high. If respondents were sceptical that people with kidney disease could be almost 
as happy as themselves, this may have dissuaded them from using the surrogate rating. Even 
respondents who believed that other people with kidney disease were as happy as 6.5 might 
judge that they themselves would not be so happy – in effect treating themselves as a special 
case.  In any event, if presented with a lower surrogate value, respondents might be expected to 
discount it less. 
Study 2 – Using Surrogates’ Happiness to Predict Self/Other Happiness  
 This study had two main aims: The first was to see how respondents respond when 
presented with a lower surrogate value. As people tend to overestimate the impact of health 
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states on happiness, a much lower surrogate happiness value would have been more consistent 
with their subjective opinion, and therefore we expect respondents would have less reason to 
discount this value. Accordingly, we presented respondents with the surrogate value of 2.5 on the 
1-9 scale. This value is lower than the predictions of respondents who received only health state 
information in study 1, and therefore we would expect respondents who received this surrogate 
value to make lower predictions than those who received only health state information. 
Secondly, as there is evidence that people evaluate the impact of health states on their own 
happiness differently to that of other people’s happiness (Baron, et al., 2003; Walsh & Ayton, 
2009), the second aim was to examine whether surrogate information influenced predictions 
differently depending on whether respondents were predicting their own happiness or the 
happiness of others. While people might discount surrogate information because they believe it 
doesn’t apply to them for some idiosyncratic reason, they might have less reason to discount it 
when considering the impact of health states for others. 
Method 
Design 
 There were 3 independent-samples conditions (only surrogate information, only health 
state information, surrogate and health state information) and all respondents made predictions 
from 2 viewpoints (self, other), except for the only health state information condition where only 
judgments for others’ happiness were collected. The dependent variable was as per study 1.  
Participants 
 Respondents were recruited and incentivised via the same methods as study 1 from 
Australian and UK universities (respondents were not recruited from the same universities who 
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had been contacted previously).  265 respondents took part in the study (11 staff and 254 
students), 84% of which were female. Age ranged from 18 to 60 years with a mean of 24 years.  
Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as Study 1 except that before being presented with the 
scenario, respondents were told to imagine that either themselves or someone close to them was 
experiencing the event (this order was counterbalanced for respondents predicting both 
viewpoints), and to indicate from a list the person they were imagining e.g. partner. This 
information was then automatically inserted into the scenario to facilitate considering the 
scenario from someone else’s viewpoint, e.g. “imagine your partner is being told by their 
doctor…”. Once they had made their predictions the scenario was presented from the alternate 
viewpoint.  
Results 
 11 respondents indicated that they or someone close to them was living with kidney 
disease and therefore their data were excluded from the analyses, leaving complete data for 254 
respondents.  
 An independent-samples t-test comparing self-happiness predictions by respondents who 
received only surrogate information or surrogate and health state information, revealed no 
significant difference, t(150) = 0.54, p = 0.59 (see table 2). However, when the self-happiness 
predictions of respondents who received only health state information in study 1 were included 
in this analysis as a third condition, there was a significant difference, F(2, 387) = 4.54, p = 0.01, 
r = 0.15. Respondents in study 1 who received only health state information made happier 
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predictions (see table 1) than respondents in study 2 who received only surrogate information (p 
= 0.05) or surrogate and health state information (p = 0.05) (see table 2).  
 Given that in this study the surrogate information was fabricated, we cannot use it in the 
same way as we used the surrogate value in study 1 to benchmark accuracy.  Nevertheless, the 
same procedure used in study 1 to determine the accuracy of predictions can also be used in this 
study to determine the degree to which respondents incorporated surrogate information into their 
judgments when it was the only information they were presented with. The predictions of 
respondents presented with only surrogate information were compared to the surrogate value of 
2.5. In contrast to respondents in study 1 who received only surrogate information of 6.5 and 
predicted they would be less happy, respondents  in study 2 presented with only surrogate 
information of 2.5 predicted that they would be significantly happier than the surrogate value 1 
year after living with kidney disease, t(46) = 3.40, p < 0.01, r = 0.45.  
  Did respondents make different predictions about their own happiness versus the 
happiness of someone close to them? Analysis exploring the self/other predictions of respondents 
who received only surrogate information or surrogate and health state information revealed no 
significant main effects or interactions
2
.  In contrast, for those who received only health state 
information, an independent samples t-test revealed a significant difference between study 1 
respondents who predicted for self and study 2 respondents who predicted for other; predictions 
for other’s happiness were significantly lower than predictions for self happiness, t(338) = 3.69, 
p <0.01, r = 0.20.  
Discussion 
 The results of study 2 confirm that people do incorporate surrogate information into their 
thinking when making their predictions. Respondents who received surrogate information of 2.5 
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either on its own or alongside health state information made significantly lower predictions than 
respondents who received only health state information.  
 Nonetheless some discounting of surrogate information still occurred even when it was 
the only information respondents received. Study 1 respondents who received only surrogate 
information of 6.5 predicted they would be less happy than the surrogates, whereas study 2 
respondents who received only surrogate information of 2.5 predicted that they would be happier 
than the surrogates, indicating that surrogate information was not the only consideration that 
respondents were basing their judgments on. The change in prediction direction depending on the 
surrogate value may be due to scale effects: noise in respondents’ judgments could result in 
truncation of responses producing positive bias for lower scale points and a negative bias for 
higher scale points (cf. Juslin, Olsson, & Björkman, 1997). Conceivably it could also reflect a 
tendency for people to think they would cope better with events that have a large impact on other 
people (when surrogates report happiness of 2.5) and worse for events that have a minimal 
impact on other people (when surrogates report happiness of 6.5).  If so however the direction of 
these predictions is somewhat surprising when compared with other findings (Kruger, 1999; 
Walsh & Ayton, 2009) showing that people tend to think they would do better than others on 
easy tasks and chronic health states they have adapted to, but worse than others on difficult tasks 
and chronic health states they have not actually experienced. The present finding can be 
distinguished from these other reports however as respondents here were presented with 
surrogate values rather than being asked to imagine them.  
 No distinction was observed in how respondents reacted to surrogate information when 
they judged the impact of kidney disease on themselves or on another. These results are 
somewhat surprising if one expects that respondents would be more likely to consider 
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themselves a special case – different to surrogates - than others.  However this may have 
occurred because we asked respondents to rate the impact of kidney disease not simply on a 
random other but on someone close to them. This might have resulted in them judging the person 
close to themselves to also be a special case and could have induced a more empathic judgment. 
 Studies 1 and 2 show that respondents incorporated surrogate information with health 
state information to make higher or lower predictions (depending on the surrogate value) than in 
the absence of surrogate information. However, even in the absence of health state information 
(other than the fact it was a health state), people discounted surrogate information and used their 
imaginations to predict their future happiness instead of substituting the value indicating peoples’ 
feelings. Respondents’ discounting of surrogate information in the presence of health state 
information could be due to health state information presented in the experiment but could also 
be because of pre-existing knowledge they had about the health state. Aside from the presented 
information, it is plausible that respondents had some knowledge and even vivid misconceptions 
of kidney disease which they might perceive as conflicting with the surrogate value, and 
accordingly convince them that the surrogate values were not a good guide to their own 
happiness. The purpose of study 3 was to control for pre-existing knowledge about the health 
state by using a health state that respondents could not know anything about. 
Study 3: Removing the Influence of Pre-existing Health State Knowledge 
 The aim of this experiment was to investigate whether respondents would discount 
surrogate information less and incorporate it more into their judgments when predicting the 
impact of a health state for which they had no pre-existing knowledge. Accordingly we invented 
an imaginary health state - piciloma. As respondents would only be able to base their judgments 
on presented information, any influence of health state information on forecasts would be 
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attributable to the information provided and not any preconceptions they brought to the 
experiment. In this study respondents were presented with one of 3 surrogate values – 3, 5 or 7 




 This study had 3 independent-samples conditions (only surrogate information, only 
health state information, surrogate and health state information). Respondents presented with 
surrogate information received a surrogate value of 3, 5, or 7. The dependent variable was the 
same as in previous studies.  
Participants 
 Respondents were recruited and incentivised as per study 1, except that occupation 
information was not collected (respondents were not recruited from the same universities who 
had been contacted previously). 489 respondents took part in the study, 71% of which were 
female. Age ranged from 18 to 60 years with a mean age of 21 years.  
Procedure 
 The procedure was as for previous studies except that respondents completed a paper 
version of the questionnaire and predicted the impact of piciloma (a fictitious health state but 
respondents were unaware of this) and were told: 
Imagine you are being told by your doctor that you have developed piciloma. In order to 
explain the likely impact of the condition, [the doctor tells you that a random sample of 
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10 people who have been living with this condition for at least 1 year report an average 
happiness of X on the 1-not happy to 9-very happy scale]. The doctor informs you that 
this is a medical condition which is caused by a virus. From time-to-time you will 
experience headaches, shivers, feeling cold, and will generally feel unwell. Treatment is 
with a tablet which you will need to take every time you experience these symptoms, but 
there is no cure for this condition. Before the doctor can discuss this further a nurse 
comes into the room to ask a question about another patient. 
Results 
 A 3 (surrogate information: 3, 5, 7) x 2 (health state information: yes, no) independent-
samples ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of surrogate information, F(2, 415) = 20.90, 
p < 0.01, ω = 0.29; predicted happiness increased as the surrogate value increased (see table 3). 
There was no main effect of health state information, F(1, 415) = 0.69, p = 0.41, but there was a 
significant interaction, F(2, 415) = 3.17, p = 0.04, ω = 0.10 (see figure 2) indicating that the 
variance in surrogate values influenced respondents with health state information less than those 
with no health state information. One-way ANOVAs indicated that varying surrogate 
information influenced respondents who received health state information, F(2, 215) = 3.43, p = 
0.03, ω = 0.15, and respondents who did not receive health state information, F(2, 200) = 23.59, 
p < 0.01, ω = 0.43. 
 Three one-sample t-tests compared the degree to which respondents incorporated 
surrogate information into their predictions when it was the only information they received.  Our 
analyses showed, as in studies 1 and 2, positive bias for lower surrogate values and negative bias 
for higher surrogate values; respondents who received surrogate information of 3 made 
predictions for their own happiness that were significantly happier than the reported happiness of 
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the surrogates, t(73) = 4.76, p < 0.01, r = 0.49; respondents who received surrogate information 
of 7 made predictions for their own happiness that were significantly less happy than the 
reported happiness of the surrogates, t(73) = -6.13, p < 0.01, r = 0.58, and respondents who 
received surrogate information of 5 predicted no significant difference, t(54) = -0.94, p = 0.35.  
Discussion 
 Predicted happiness increased as the surrogate value increased, indicating that 
respondents were using the surrogate information when predicting their future happiness. 
However respondents’ forecasts were discrepant from the surrogate values indicating they 
thought they were different to others – even in the case where they had no information other than 
the surrogate values.  
 The influence of surrogate values on predictions was reduced when health state 
information was presented alongside surrogate information: respondents discounted the surrogate 
value more in the presence of health state information than its absence. This was despite the fact 
that, due to the fictitious nature of the health state, they were only able to base their predictions 
on the information provided; excluding pre-existing health state knowledge still resulted in a 
discounting of surrogate information. Surrogate information was incorporated into affective 
forecasts but the extent to which it was used was reduced in the presence of other knowledge 
about the health state; this reduction cannot be attributed to the influence of any pre-existing 
knowledge of the event.  
 One reason why discounting of surrogate information occurred could be because 
respondents were sensitive to the distribution of scores of a population. Respondents may have 
discounted the mean happiness of ten surrogates because they considered it a small sample which 
could represent an extreme view within the distribution of people with that health condition. If 
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so, increasing the surrogate sample size should lead to reduced discounting of the surrogate 
information.  
Study 4: Increasing the Surrogate Sample Size 
 The aim of study 4 was to examine whether respondents were sensitive to the sample size 
of the surrogates by increasing the group size of the surrogates from 10 to 1000. Would 
respondents’ discount surrogate information less when the size of the surrogate group was 
increased? The three independent-samples “only surrogate information” conditions from study 3 
were rerun but this time the group size of the surrogates was changed to 1000. 
Method 
Participants 
 Respondents were recruited and incentivised as per previous studies (respondents were 
not recruited from the same universities who had been contacted previously). 261 respondents 
took part (3 staff and 258 students), 56% of which were female. Ages ranged from 18 to 46 years 
with a mean age of 21 years.  
Results 
 Results from this study were compared to the only surrogate information conditions from 
study 3 (see table 3). A 2 (condition: surrogate 10, surrogate 1000) x 2 (surrogate information: 3, 
5, 7) independent samples ANOVA revealed no main effect of condition, F(1, 458) = 1.14, p = 
0.29, a significant main effect of surrogate information, F(2, 458) = 59.10, p < 0.01, ω = 0.66, 
and no interaction F(2, 458) = 0.19, p = 0.83. 




 Substantially increasing the size of the surrogate sample had no effect on the extent to 
which respondents incorporated the information into their predictions; discounting of surrogate 
values occurred to the same degree. Furthermore, examination of the percentages in table 3 
reveals little change in the percentage of happiness ratings which were less than, equal to, or 
greater than the surrogate rating when the size of the surrogate sample was increased. This 
suggests that respondents were not disregarding the surrogate information because they were 
sensitive to the size of the surrogate sample.    
 An alternative candidate explanation as to why respondents discounted surrogate 
information, making forecasts that were higher than low surrogate values but lower than high 
surrogate values, is because of the proximity of the surrogate information to the endpoints of the 
scale.  If we assume that respondents’ judgments consist of a true score plus random error (cf. 
Thurstone, 1927) this could result in bias in responses when mapped onto a finite scale with 
endpoints; thus, error variance around judgments near the ends of the scale would be more 
constrained by the nearest endpoint in one direction but could vary more freely in the other 
direction.  For cases where the added random error produced responses exceeding the scale 
values, truncation to the end points of the scale would result in positive bias for lower scale 
values and negative bias for higher scale values (cf. Juslin et al., 1997).  Accordingly, the 
observed discounting of surrogate values could conceivably be due to noise in judgment rather 
than any underlying bias in judgment. To address this possibility we replicated study 4 using a 
scale which allowed more responses beyond the high and low surrogate values.  
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Study 5: Extending the Happiness Scale 
 The aim of this study was to explore whether respondents’ tendency to discount surrogate 
values was due to constraints of the response scale. In this study the happiness response scale 
was increased to a 1-21 scale with the same endpoints of 1 (not happy) to 21 (very happy). The 
three independent samples conditions from study 4 were rerun but this time the surrogate 
information presented was 6, 11, or 16, to give respondents greater freedom to predict more 
extreme values than the surrogate value. 
Method 
Participants 
 Respondents were recruited and incentivised as per previous studies (respondents were 
not recruited from the same universities who had been contacted previously). 213 respondents 
took part (6 staff and 207 students), 65% of which were female. Ages ranged from 18 to 51 years 
with a mean age of 23 years.  
Results and Discussion 
 We again observed that respondents’ forecasts discounted extreme surrogate values. 
Three one-sample t-tests revealed that respondents who received the surrogate information of 6 
made predictions for their own happiness that were significantly happier than the reported 
happiness of the surrogates, t(71) = 5.10, p < 0.01, r = 0.52; respondents who received the 
surrogate information of 11 predicted no difference in their happiness compared to the 
surrogates, t(75) = 0.23, p = 0.82; and respondents who received the surrogate information of 16 
made predictions that were significantly less happy than the reported happiness of the surrogates, 
t(64) = -5.60, p < 0.01, r = 0.57 (see table 4).   
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 The critical question for this study was whether increasing the scale to allow more 
extreme responses reduced the amount of discounting we observed.  We analysed the number of 
responses that were above, below and equal to the surrogate value and compared it to the 
corresponding responses in study 4.  A 3 (surrogate value: high, medium, low) x 3 (responses: 
greater than surrogate value, equal to surrogate value, less than surrogate value) x 2 (study: study 
4, study 5) loglinear analysis showed that the surrogate value x response interaction, χ
2
(4) = 
80.77, p < 0.01, did not vary between the two studies - the three-way interaction was not 
significant, χ
2
(4) = 1.58, p = 0.81.  We conclude that the discounting of surrogate information is 
unlikely to be due to any artefact caused by scale end-point effects.  
General Discussion 
 Our studies have shown that people incorporate knowledge about the happiness of others 
into their forecasts when predicting the impact of a health state on their own happiness. We also 
showed that when health state information was withheld, people increased their use of surrogate 
information as a basis for their predictions. This is consistent with previous research (Gilbert et 
al., 2009; Norwick et al., 2006) and corroborative of Gilbert’s (2006) claim that affective 
forecasts can be improved by withholding event information and providing only surrogate 
information.  
 Critically, from our perspective, the influence of surrogate information was reduced by 
the presence of event (health state) information; respondents incorporated surrogate information 
less into their predictions when presented with both types of information than when only 
presented with surrogate information.  As we noted in the introduction, in many practical 
contexts it will be virtually impossible to exclude event information from people contemplating 
surrogate information, which, given its strong influence on judgment, places limits on the value 
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of the surrogate information proposal. Despite this, when surrogate information was available 
together with event information, people used both types of information. In cases where the 
surrogate value is an accurate indicator of the impact of an event, informing people about the 
happiness of others’ can help them to make more realistic forecasts both with and without event 
information. However, because people place emphasis on event information, they do not 
maximise the utility of the information presented. As Gilbert (2006) suggested and as Gilbert et 
al. (2009) showed, people do not fully appreciate the value of surrogate information and instead 
favour using event information to imagine how the event would affect them differently to others.  
 Even when it was the only information provided, respondents discounted the surrogate 
information and imagined that their life would be different to the surrogates. This discounting of 
surrogate information was not affected by excluding pre-existing knowledge about the target 
event, changing the size of the surrogate sample, or increasing the size of the response scale. 
Despite respondents having no information about the target event - bar the fact that it was some 
kind of adverse health state - and limited surrogate information, they still adjusted from the 
information they are provided with, suggesting that withholding event information had not 
successfully blocked their imaginations. Using only surrogate information as a guide to future 
emotions is a good way to improve predictions but due both to the tenacity of imagination and 
because people believe they are different to others, it is not a panacea for eliminating all the bias 
in affective judgments.  
 A limitation of our studies is that they all involved respondents contemplating their 
reactions to imaginary situations.  It is possible that patients confronted with real diagnoses of 
chronic health conditions and given surrogate information would react somewhat differently, 
My Imagination      27 
 
 
though it is easier for us to imagine that their forecasts might be more – rather than less – 
extreme than those we observe here.    
In several of our analyses data were compared across studies, and we acknowledge that 
sampling differences could have contributed to any effects. However we feel that these have 
been kept to a minimum as the type of respondents, the method of recruitment, and the nature of 
the questionnaires were consistent across the studies. 
 Our studies have shown that people do not spontaneously maximise the value of 
information about other peoples’ happiness when forecasting their own happiness. Future 
research should address whether the discounting of surrogate information could be reduced by 
guiding people as to the value of this information. The surrogacy proposal could be more 
effective as a remedy for biased judgments if people could be persuaded that surrogate 
information was a good guide to their own happiness. 
In the introduction we discussed the possibility that people might disregard surrogate 
information because they believe they are different to others. Future research could explore this 
further by examining whether making the surrogate more similar to the respondents reduces the 
discounting of surrogate information. It is plausible that if respondents perceive that they have 
more in common with the surrogate, then they might be more willing to incorporate surrogate 
happiness into their forecasts.  
 Our research indicates that in many practical settings, even though it is often not possible 
to withhold event information, providing surrogate information alongside event information 
would help people to envisage their future. Knowing the well-being of people living with a 
health state as well as information about the health state, should help people more realistically 
imagine the impact on their own well-being. Similarly, being informed of the well-being of 
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company employees alongside information about a job could help potential applicants determine 
their enjoyment on being hired. Although people do not use knowledge about the happiness of 
others to their best advantage, incorporating this information with event information should help 
them to more realistically anticipate the future. 
 Affective forecasts underlie many life decisions and as a consequence many decisions 
may be suboptimal because affective forecasts are biased (Sevdalis & Harvey, 2007).  Although 
progress has been made towards improving affective forecasts, our findings indicate that more 
needs to be done to exploit the full potential of surrogation. 
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Amount of detail provided about the health state was explored but as no significant 
effects were found of this manipulation, data are reported collapsed into one group. 
2
 Analyses revealed that self/other predictions did not depend on the order in which these 
questions were asked so all subsequent analyses were collapsed across this variable. 
 




Mean (and Standard Deviation) Predicted Happiness 1 Year after Living with Kidney Disease  
Condition Predicted Happiness 
Only surrogate information 5.69 (1.31) 
Only health state information 3.83 (1.72) 
Surrogate and health state information 4.36 (1.70) 
Note: Surrogate information was 6.5 on a 1 (not happy) to 9 (very happy) scale. Predicted 
happiness was rated on the same scale. 
 




Mean (and Standard Deviation) Predicted Happiness 1 Year after Living with Kidney Disease 
Condition Viewpoint Predicted Happiness 
Only surrogate information Self 3.20 (1.42) 
 Other 3.17 (1.55) 
Surrogate and health state information Self 3.36 (1.71) 
 Other 3.05 (1.57) 
Only health state information Other 3.09 (1.64) 
Note: Surrogate information was 2.5 on a 1 (not happy) to 9 (very happy) scale. Predicted 
happiness was rated on the same scale. 
 





Mean (and Standard Deviation) Predicted Happiness 1 Year after Living with Health State, and 
Percentage of Happiness Ratings Less Than, Equal to, or Greater Than Surrogate Value.   
Note: Surrogate values and predicted happiness were rated on a 1 (not happy) to 9 (very happy) 
scale. 
 Study 3 – surrogate sample 10 
Study 4  - surrogate 
sample 1000 
Surrogate information Health state information 
Health state 
information 




>18%,= 7%,< 75% 
3.95 (1.71) 
>20%, =22%, <58% 
4.01 (1.61) 




>40%, =17%, <43% 
4.78 (1.73) 
>38%, =24%, <38% 
5.07 (1.42) 




>71%, =15%, <14% 
5.85 (1.62) 
>65%, =22%. <13% 
5.97 (1.51) 
>57%, =28%, <15% 
No surrogate 
information 
4.49 (1.87) - - 




Mean (and Standard Deviation) Predicted Happiness 1 Year after Living with Health State, and 
Percentage of Happiness Ratings Less Than, Equal to, or Greater Than Surrogate Value 
 No, health state information 
Surrogate sample 1000 
Surrogate information 6 8.19 (3.65) 
>19%, =19%, <62% 
Surrogate information 11 11.10 (3.67) 
>41%, =13%, <46% 
Surrogate information 16 13.10 (4.18) 
>62%, =19%, <19% 










Figure 1. The interaction between happiness rating and condition (study 1) 






























Current happiness Predicted happiness
 
Note: Surrogate information was 6.5 on a 1 (not happy) to 9 (very happy) scale. Current 
happiness and predicted happiness were rated on the same scale. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
Figure 1.  
 





































Health state information No health state information
 
Note: Surrogate values and predicted happiness were rated on a 1 (not happy) to 9 (very happy) 
scale. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
